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Updating our Understanding of the
Role of Lawyers: Lessons
from MasterCard
Scott R. Peppett
In the last several years, MasterCard has been involved in two of
the most interesting and complex legal negotiations in recent mem-
ory. The first was the 2003 settlement of the largest antitrust class
action on record, involving some of the nation's largest domestic re-
tailers against MasterCard, Visa, and their owner banks. The sec-
ond, which is the topic of Professor Fleischer's Case Study, was the
announcement and structuring of the May 2006 MasterCard IPO.
This Comment argues that it is difficult to understand the latter
without delving a bit into the former. Moreover, once we examine
them together, interesting lessons emerge about both legal negotia-
tion and the role of lawyers in modern practice.
Professors Fleischer and Wright also link the IPO to Master-
Card's antitrust litigation, arguing that by becoming a single entity
MasterCard has reduced some of its antitrust exposure.1 This Com-
ment tells a slightly different, but certainly complementary, story. I
argue that in addition to transforming MasterCard from a consor-
tium of competitor member banks into a single entity, the IPO also
serves to distance MasterCard from another source of its litigation
headaches: Visa. By rearranging its corporate structure, MasterCard
has taken one more step in what is now a clear evolution towards real
independence from its historical charge card ally. This, in turn, may
help MasterCard both reduce its antitrust liability and, perhaps as
important, improve its leverage in ongoing negotiations with
merchants, merchant banks, and regulators. In contrast to their
"single entity" theory, I call this, with some tongue in cheek, the
"dual entity" theory of the IPO.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. Email:
scott.peppet@colorado.edu. I thank Victor Fleischer for inviting this commentary and
the editors of the Harvard Negotiation Law Review for organizing this symposium.
1. Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12
HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 150 (2006); Joshua D. Wright, Mastercard's Single Entity
Strategy, 12 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 225, 229 (2006).
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After describing the MasterCard litigation and the IPO, and af-
ter delving more into this theory of "duality" - or separation from
Visa - this Comment closes by drawing lessons from MasterCard
about both negotiation and the role of lawyers in modern practice.
Although some of these refer primarily to the MasterCard litigation
rather than to the IPO, they are too good to pass by at a symposium
sponsored by a journal dedicated to negotiation.
I. MASTERCARD'S RECENT LEGAL HISTORY
Visa and MasterCard dominate the general-purpose credit card
market, together holding roughly seventy percent market share.2
(Importantly, Visa holds roughly forty-seven percent of the market,
whereas MasterCard holds twenty-six. American Express accounts
for twenty percent; Discover for six percent.) Historically, each was
a not-for-profit membership organization with thousands of financial
institutions as its members. (In 2003, MasterCard became a private
corporation - MasterCard, Inc. - with the owner banks as sharehold-
ers.) Although they were theoretically competitors, Visa and Master-
card cooperated to a great extent. Member banks could, for example,
belong to both associations, the two companies generally set similar
card policies for both consumers and merchants, and their fees were
often similar. Because of their combined market strength, merchants
rarely succeeded in negotiating to change such terms or fees. As one
merchant processor stated, "because Visa and MasterCard have con-
trol of the market, they can do what they want and get away with
A decade ago, this era of dominance began to unravel. In 1996,
Wal-Mart Stores fired the first shot by bringing suit against Visa and
MasterCard, alleging that the two networks were illegally tying their
credit and debit products.4 The theory of the case was simple: under
Visa and MasterCard's historical "honor all cards" rule, if a retailer
wanted to accept a MasterCard credit card, MasterCard also required
that retailer to take the same brand's offline (signature-based) debit
2. Douglas Akers et al., Overview of Recent Developments in the Credit Card
Industry, 17 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 23, 25 (2005); see also Eunice A. Moon, Note,
Redefining Relevant Markets under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 797,
804 (2003).
3. David Balto, The Problem of Interchange Fees: Costs Without Benefits?, 4
E.C.L.R. 215, 216 (2000).
4. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 297 F. Supp. 2d 503
(E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.
2005).
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card. The suit alleged that MasterCard and Visa were making exces-
sive profits on these debit transactions. Whereas credit cards carry
with them an inherit credit risk of default, debit cards, which draw
funds directly from the user's bank, should theoretically be less costly
to operate. Plaintiffs argued that Visa and MasterCard were requir-
ing retailers to take such debit cards at "inflated" rates through this
anticompetitive tying arrangement. In addition, the plaintiffs
pointed to evidence that this tying arrangement was hurting consum-
ers - whereas similar ATM networks, which process PIN-based debit
transactions, routinely charged roughly fourteen to thirty cents to
route a $100 debit card transaction, MasterCard and Visa were
charging roughly $1.50 for their signature debit card transactions.
5
The case was not just about tying, however, nor primarily about
remedying past damages. The real objective of the merchant plain-
tiffs was to improve their bargaining leverage with the charge card
industry going forward. The merchants knew that by gaining the
right to refuse certain charge card products (such as signature debit
transactions), they could later use that right as a bargaining chip for
other desired concessions (e.g., agreeing to continue to accept signa-
ture debit transactions in exchange for lower interchange fees).
6
In 2000, the case became a class action, with the lead plaintiffs
representing approximately five million retailers and ultimately
seeking roughly $24 billion in damages. The economics of a case of
this magnitude are far from simple. The legal fees and other costs in
a class action involving most of the nation's major retailers, on the
one hand, and practically all of the nation's leading banks, on the
other, were enormous. 7 In addition, conducting a cost accounting to
compare credit card costs to debit card costs, though possible, is in
itself a monumentally expensive discovery task.
In April 2003, MasterCard settled its case on the courthouse
steps, only a week prior to the start of trial. Although it initially pos-
tured that it planned to continue litigation, Visa followed suit two
days later. Under the terms of the settlement, MasterCard agreed to
pay roughly $1 billion in damages to the merchant class over ten
years, and Visa to pay $2 billion. In addition, retailers won the right
5. Jennifer Bayot, Lawyers Seek $609 Million Fee for Negotiating Deal for Re-
tailers with Visa and MasterCard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, at C4. MasterCard and
Visa argue that their debit transactions were not the same, because when a consumer
uses a debit card she must sign for the transaction, whereas ATM transactions are
PIN-based.
6. David Balto, Life After the Wal-Mart Case, 16 CREDIT CARD MGT. (Aug. 2003).
7. The plaintiffs' lawyers ultimately sought $609 million for their work. Bayot,
supra note 5.
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to accept credit cards but not debit cards, or to accept only debit cards
processed using a user PIN number rather than the user's signature
(for which the retailers pay far less in fees). Finally, both MasterCard
and Visa agreed to lower their transaction fees for an interim period
from August to December 2003, and then to set fees based on market
indicators.
In December 2003, the presiding Federal District Court approved
the $3 billion settlement. The settlement "untied" credit and debit,
such that as of January 1, 2004, a retailer could no longer be required
by MasterCard to accept debit cards in order to be permitted to accept
credit cards. The theory of the settlement was that increased compe-
tition between Visa and MasterCard would lead to lower transaction
fees."
The game had changed. Almost immediately after the settle-
ment, Wal-Mart announced that it would begin offering only PIN-
based debit transactions. Other retailers similarly began experi-
menting with their credit and debit policies. As one commentator
noted, "The primary significance of these cases is that merchants
have become a much stronger bargaining partner in negotiations over
the responsibilities and fees associated with credit card
transactions."9
Almost simultaneously, Visa and MasterCard were dealt another
blow, this time by the Justice Department. In October 2004, the gov-
ernment prevailed in a 1998 suit against Visa and MasterCard that
ultimately opened the door for American Express and Discover to do
business with the Visa/MasterCard member banks. 10 Whereas his-
torically MasterCard had prevented member banks from also issuing
American Express or Discover cards, it could no longer do so. Mem-
ber banks immediately began taking advantage of their new opportu-
nity - historical MasterCard issuers like Citi and Bank of America
have begun issuing American Express, and General Electric's con-
sumer credit branch now issues Discover. 1
8. There is some evidence that lower rates materialized. As of January 31,
2004, Visa lowered its rates to roughly 11 percent lower than pre-settlement, or
roughly twenty cents less on a $100 payment. As of April 2, 2004, MasterCard simi-
larly lowered its rates to about thirty-two percent lower than pre-settlement rates.
Jennifer Bayot, Final Pact Approved in Long-Running Debit Card Litigation, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at C4.
9. Akers et al., supra note 2, at 30.
10. U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 344 F.3d
229 (2d Cir. 2003).
11. Liz Moyer, How Priceless Is This IPO?, May 19, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/
strategies/2006/05/18/ipo-outlook-mastercard-cx lm_0519master.html.
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These monumental changes in the charge card industry placed
MasterCard and Visa in a relatively new, and uncomfortably compet-
itive, situation. The 2003 settlement showed that the charge card in-
dustry was vulnerable and could be forced to bargain. 12 The credit
giants now faced ongoing negotiations with merchants over product
fees and terms. Simultaneously, the two companies faced new pres-
sure from their member banks, as banks began experimenting with
new card products after the Justice Department victory. Finally, con-
sumers were also placing pressure on MasterCard and Visa, demand-
ing more robust charge card products that could respond to new
threats of identity theft and Internet fraud.
It was time for something completely different.
II. LESSONS FROM MASTERCARD
A. The Dual Entity Theory of the IPO
Because Professor Fleischer offers a complete description of the
IPO in this issue, 13 there is no reason to delve into the details here.
Suffice it to say that the May 2006 IPO was the largest of the year to
that point, and raised $2.4 billion.
As Professors Fleischer and Wright have described in their com-
mentaries, the IPO transformed MasterCard into a single entity
rather than a consortium of competitors, thereby reducing some of its
exposure to antitrust litigation over interchange fees. 14 Put differ-
ently, through the IPO, MasterCard has improved its leverage vis-&-
vis its ongoing antitrust litigation/negotiation with the merchant
banks by converting into a single entity that is no longer under the
control of the member or issuer banks. As Brian Smith, a former
General Counsel of MasterCard and now a private securities lawyer,
stated, "as for the defensive aspects, this is a brilliant stroke." 15
This analysis seems right, particularly vis-A-vis the pending liti-
gation over interchange fees. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that
almost immediately after the issuance, plaintiffs in the merchant
class litigation amended their complaints to attempt to unravel the
IPO as an improper attempt by MasterCard to immunize itself from
12. For example, in June 2005, various small and midsize businesses brought
suit against Visa and MasterCard, and their member banks, alleging anticompetitive
price fixing on transaction fees.
13. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 144-47.
14. Id., at 150; Wright, supra note 1, at 229.
15. Joe Bel Bruno, MasterCard IPO Strategy Seen Priceless in Bailing Credit-
Card Brand Out of Legal Trouble, FIN. TIMEs, (Dec. 2, 2005), available at http://www.
accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary-0286-11924036_ITM.
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liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The amended com-
plaint asserts that "the purported single entity will operate in the
same way as the current member banks' cartel: the member banks
will control the setting of interchange fees collectively and will main-
tain artificially high fees by refusing to compete on price, while
preventing new entry into the relevant market."16 Plaintiffs even al-
leged that if it gained Section 1 immunity through the IPO, Master-
Card would gain market power, making anticompetitive behavior
more likely.17 Whether such claims succeed is to be determined.
In addition to this analysis of the impact of the IPO on the in-
terchange litigation, I speculate that the IPO also improves Master-
Card's negotiation position vis-A-vis the other competitive struggles
in which it finds itself. Put simply, the IPO is a way for MasterCard
to distance itself from, and increase competition with, its historical
ally Visa.
i. Responding to the Merchants and Merchant Banks. As a first
explanation of this "dual entity" theory of the IPO, consider Master-
Card's ongoing negotiations with merchants and merchant banks. As
MasterCard bargains with merchants - such as Wal-Mart - over the
issues raised by the 2003 tying case and over product placement, co-
branding of charge cards, etc., the new, public MasterCard may have
an advantage over the historical MasterCard. First and foremost, it
will be much harder for merchants to lump MasterCard and Visa to-
gether as one entity or indistinguishable class of defendants.
Whereas historically the owners of the two associations were essen-
tially identical, and even the governing bodies were intertwined,
MasterCard's IPO allows it to take a significant step away from Visa
(and Visa's much larger market share). It will no longer be controlled
by the same member banks that control Visa, and thus, it will no
longer be possible to make the argument that the two charge card
giants are colluding to inflate fees, suppress competition, or engage in
other questionable activities.
The historical relationship between Visa and MasterCard was a
powerful weapon for both companies from their inception until the
2003 Wal-Mart settlement. At that point, however, MasterCard
must have realized the liability that close association with Visa could
create. Even had MasterCard wished to defend itself in court, its link
16. Erin Coe, Class Action Takes Aim at MasterCard IPO, COMPETITION LAW 360
(May 24, 2006), http://competition.law360.com/Secure/ViewArticle.aspx?id=6724.
17. Id.
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to Visa - and Visa's market share - made it too vulnerable. It was
forced to settle, in part, because of its close association with Visa.
The historical Visa/MasterCard relationship can only be de-
scribed as overly cooperative. At least from an antitrust perspective,
"the level of network competition was less than overwhelming ...
Neither Visa nor MasterCard were seen to compete aggressively
against one another. Moreover, Visa and MasterCard consistently in-
creased interchange fees (the effective charge to merchants for han-
dling transactions) in lock-step fashion for years."' 8 The rules of the
two associations allowed issuer banks to control them both: "almost
all of the large card issuing banks ha[d] representatives on one of the
associations' boards of directors, as well as representatives on the im-
portant committees that influence policy for both networks." 19
However, since the 2003 Wal-Mart settlement, and the Depart-
ment of Justice "duality" judgment of the same year, MasterCard has
been distancing itself from its ally. Indeed, prior to the judgment,
MasterCard was already separating its governance from Visa, as the
market demanded more competition. As David Balto has noted:
Throughout history the associations have been on the same
side of the courtroom, defending nearly identical rules against
an onslaught from private antitrust lawyers, government anti-
trust enforcers, merchants, and rival networks.
Now that the associations are taking on distinctly different
membership, competitive philosophy and governance, they find
themselves at odds, particularly in the debit environment.
20
The two giants, in short, have been pulling away from each other and
becoming truly independent competitors. In my view, the IPO is one
more step in that process.
18. David A. Balto, Impact of 'Visa' Decision, NATL. L.J., (Nov. 29, 2004). It is
important to distinguish between two types of competition in the charge card indus-
try: competition between networks for issuer banks, and competition between net-
works in the market for merchant acceptance and adoption. In the former, Visa and
MasterCard had begun to compete, even prior to the Wal-Mart and Department of
Justice suits. In 1998, for example, Visa and MasterCard entered a rate war, each
increasing their interchange fees in response to raises by the other. Such increases
inure to the benefit of issuer banks-and to the harm of merchants and merchant
banks. Although the two networks claimed that the increases were cost driven, "the
bidding war seemed to provide incentives solely for issuers." Balto, supra note 3, at
215-16. On the merchant side, however, there was little competition between the
associations.
19. David A. Balto, The Visa-MasterCard Decision and its Implications for High
Tech Markets, 1408 PLI/Corp 151, 155 (2004).
20. David Balto, The New Competitive Challenges for Credit and Debit Cards, 16
CREDIT CARD MGT. (Feb. 2004).
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Put differently, the MasterCard IPO in some ways marks the end
of the era of cozy cooperation between MasterCard and Visa, and the
beginning of a new era that will most likely be marked by
Brandenburger and Nalebuffs somewhat awkward term "coopeti-
tion."21 Clearly the two companies will continue to cooperate in
many ways - for now they remain the giants of the charge card indus-
try. At the same time, the IPO signaled to the market, and to adver-
saries, that the two companies can no longer be tleated as one. (One
more example of this separation - and of increased pressure by
merchants on the charge card giants - occurred on September 5,
2006, when MasterCard announced that it would begin posting on its
website all interchange rates that apply to U.S. merchants. 22 As of
December 15, 2006, Visa had not yet followed suit.)
From a doctrinal standpoint, this separation does not guarantee
MasterCard immunity - the courts have already ruled that Master-
Card has market power independently of Visa.23 (This could, of
course, change if Discover and American Express gain market share
- which the Wal-Mart and Department of Justice cases make possi-
ble. Paradoxically, at the very moment that Wal-Mart succeeded in
having MasterCard's market power recognized by the courts, Wal-
Mart may have begun the undoing of that market power.) Even with
market power, however, it will become more difficult for plaintiffs to
show collusive or market distorting activities by MasterCard once the
company is no longer in such close association with Visa. Put differ-
ently, the MasterCard IPO changes the symbolic landscape in the
charge card industry - it was too vulnerable when it was in lock-step
with Visa, and it will now be a far more difficult target.
ii. Increasing Competition with Visa for Issuer Banks. The IPO
has another important effect that distances the two historical allies:
it is a way for MasterCard to compete with Visa in the market for
issuer banks.
As Professors Fleischer and Wright explain, the IPO provides in-
creased immunity for MasterCard issuers - above and beyond what
Visa can currently offer those issuers. Although as of this symposium
there has been much discussion on Wall Street about a possible Visa
21. ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, COOPETITION: A REVOLU-
TION MINDSET THAT COMBINES COMPETITION AND COOPERATION (1996).




23. U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003).
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IPO, the company has not announced plans to go public. In their
competition for issuer banks, therefore, the IPO may give Master-
Card an advantage.
Not only will separation from Visa shield MasterCard's member
banks from liability to some extent, the IPO will also permit the
banks to exit the MasterCard network by cashing out. Although no
banks have yet indicated a desire to do so, it is expected that some of
them will. A new, public MasterCard might then set up licensing ar-
rangements so that banks can issue cards without owning a share of
the company - something that the membership structure did not
allow.
This will further distinguish MasterCard from Visa by allowing
for a change in ownership of MasterCard as banks exit. Given the
liabilities of recent litigation and the possible desire of some banks to
have increased flexibility, this will be to the competitive advantage of
MasterCard vis-A-vis Visa.
This benefit for issuer banks is particularly important at this mo-
ment because the charge card giants are now severely restricted in
their ability to raise interchange fees to provide more to their issuer
banks. The Wal-Mart and Department of Justice litigation and the
ongoing interchange fee litigation all limited the industry's freedom
of movement. MasterCard and Visa are caught between a rock and a
hard place - on the one side, the merchant class now has the leverage
to negotiate lower fees, while on the other side, their issuer banks
have also won the right to adopt competing products (e.g., Discover
and American Express) and are demanding more concessions as well.
The IPO creates benefits (e.g., immunity and exit) that, for now, only
MasterCard can offer its issuers.
Overall, this increased competition on both sides should be good
for consumers:
"Only where networks truly compete for both sides of the
equation, card issuing banks and merchants, and merchants
have the right and ability to use lower cost networks to route
transactions to card issuers, can consumers be assured that in-
terchange fees are not just a hidden tax from consumers to
banks."
24
24. Balto, supra note 3, at 224. See also Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel,
Transaction Costs, Externalities, and "Two-Sides" Payment Markets, 3 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 617, 634 (2005) (discussing burdens on consumers placed by interchange fees).
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B. Negotiation Lessons
This Section explores some of the negotiation advice one might
glean from MasterCard's experience.
i. Don't Play Chicken With Wal-Mart. First and foremost, the
2003 antitrust litigation illustrates a simple rule: "Don't Play
Chicken with Wal-Mart." This advice has been painfully learned by
many corporations over the last few years, but has somehow escaped
the negotiation textbooks. It is clear in hindsight that Wal-Mart has
had a profound impact on the charge card industry, as it has in many
other areas of the global economy. Prior to the 2003 settlement,
merchants had been largely unsuccessful in negotiating with Visa
and MasterCard over transaction fees and terms of card use. Since
the settlement, as discussed above, these negotiations have changed
dramatically.
The change did not come because of Wal-Mart alone, of course.
The real power came from the coalition of merchant plaintiffs that
formed around Wal-Mart. 25 That coalition presented a relatively uni-
fied front, and it had the resources to pursue litigation fully. It also
offered a complete settlement of the various antitrust issues, so that
MasterCard and Visa could avoid piecemeal and protracted bargain-
ing with many different merchants over many years. Finally, by
bringing together the entire merchant class, the coalition symboli-
cally represented all of the charge card industry's most important
customers. As Noah Hanft, MasterCard's General Counsel, said at
the time of the 2003 settlement, "we thought it was time to make
peace with the merchant community, which is an important
constituency. ,
26
What is particularly interesting is that to respond to this new
and more coherent plaintiffs' coalition, MasterCard is choosing to
abandon its own coalition with Visa. This does not follow the typical
formula, where one would imagine that remaining with one's allies -
"sticking together" - would best counter the formation of a powerful
merchant class. Nevertheless, it is clearly in MasterCard's interest
at this point to go its own way. The MasterCard IPO improves its
leverage vis-A-vis the merchant coalition by distancing MasterCard
further from Visa.
25. Balto, supra note 6. ("One of the reasons merchants have been less effective
in negotiating with the card associations in the U.S. has been their inability to act
collectively. By bringing this case and having a class of merchants certified, the plain-
tiffs overcame this problem.").
26. Jennifer Bayot, Visa Reaches Settlement in Debit Card Case, N.Y. TrMEs, May
1, 2003, at C1.
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ii. One's "BATNA" is Always Dynamic, not Static. In teaching
and discussing bargaining dynamics, negotiation scholars too often
oversimplify the dynamic nature of one's "best alternative to a negoti-
ated agreement" or "BATNA."27 We teach our students to analyze
their BATNA and to consider the other side's alternative as well.
This advice sometimes implies, however, that once you determine
your BATNA, it remains fixed. The MasterCard IPO is powerful
proof that this is error - and that by recognizing the dynamic nature
of one's legal alternative can greatly increase one's bargaining power.
The real drama behind the MasterCard IPO is that it illustrates
a creative reengineering of the boundaries of MasterCard's antitrust
negotiations. Typically, we assume that litigating parties share their
BATNA - their alternative to settlement is court adjudication of their
dispute. They may argue about the value of going to court, about
their differing perceptions of the strengths of their legal claims, or
about the distributive issues involved in settlement, but ultimately if
they can't agree, they will adjudicate. The MasterCard IPO shows
that in some instances, a creative party can shatter this assumption
and engineer an entirely new alternative that radically changes the
negotiation dynamics. By going public, MasterCard changed the
value of the litigation by making an out-of-court move in the market
that radically changed the in-court dynamics.
Other examples of such game-changing moves can be found, al-
though we seldom focus on them. One occurred in my home town of
Boulder, Colorado recently, and is worth recounting here. The City of
Boulder had been negotiating with Macerich Company, one of the
country's largest owners of retail malls, over the redevelopment of
what is now known as the "29th Street" mall. Boulder had taken a
hard line bargaining position for years, as had Macerich, over the
scope of the redevelopment, city zoning concessions, and related is-
sues. It was a classic case of tough bilateral monopoly bargaining -
neither side could walk away easily, and as a result, hard bargaining
tactics escalated. 28 Ultimately, Macerich had had enough. In a
game-changing move in some ways quite similar to MasterCard's,
Macerich went ten miles south, to the neighboring town of Broom-
field, and bought Broomfield's newest and most profitable mall - the
Flatirons Crossing. It then threatened to simply close the existing
facility at 29th Street, a threat made considerably more credible by
27. FISHER, URY & PATTON, GETTING TO YES 100 (2d ed. 1991).
28. For analysis of why bilateral monopoly conditions lead to hard bargaining
behavior, see Scott R. Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We
Use Mediators in Deals?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 283, 302-15 (2004).
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its ownership of the local shopping alternative. Almost immediately,
Boulder changed its tune, and the negotiations were resolved.
This story, like MasterCard's IPO, underscores the importance of
understanding that one's alternative to accepting the other side's
deal terms is sometimes to change the fundamental assumptions of
the market or context by making a bold market move. It is a lesson
that negotiation students should remember - and that lawyers
should incorporate into their repertoire.
iii. There's Still Something Special About the Courthouse Steps.
Federal District Judge John Gleeson called the 2003 MasterCard
agreement an "11th-hour settlement."29 At the same time, their late
settlement may not be the parties' responsibility alone. Many com-
mentators thought that several pre-trial motion rulings made on
April 1, 2003 to MasterCard's detriment led the company to settle. In
particular, Judge Gleeson found that debit cards and credit cards
were separate products, thereby opening the door to the tying claim.
As David Balto, a former director of policy at the Federal Trade Com-
mission, said at the time, "April 1 was it; the judge's decision basi-
cally signaled to these parties that he believed the plaintiffs had a
very strong case."30
Despite decades of advice from negotiation and alternative dis-
pute resolution scholars urging parties to settle earlier by reducing
uncertainty, it is clear that in "bet the company" litigation in fields
with inherent doctrinal uncertainty, settlement can be extremely dif-
ficult. Uncertainty is notorious in antitrust cases, where the doctrine
is broad and new products - such as debit cards - are often difficult to
classify. Although millions of dollars were spent on legal fees and
decision analysis in the Wal-Mart litigation, it is clear that nothing
quite persuades like a judge's ruling.
iv. Where Were the Mediators, Arbitrators, and other Conflict
Specialists? From a dispute resolution perspective, one of the most
interesting aspects of all of this recent charge card litigation is the
apparent absence of mediators or other conflict specialists. Despite
the enormous litigation costs involved, and the "bet the company" na-
ture of these suits, there is no reported evidence that the parties
sought neutral assistance in any of these cases.
If this is accurate - and it is difficult to know, absent full disclo-
sure by the parties, who aren't talking - it seems to support Bernie
29. Jennifer Bayot, MasterCard Settles Case with Retailers Ahead of Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at C1.
30. Id.
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Mayer's recent argument that the field of conflict resolution is in a
deepening crisis of irrelevance. Mayer starts with the observation
that "[c]onflict resolution professionals are not significantly involved
in the major conflicts of our times,"31 and goes on to argue that this is
largely due to the field's over-identification with neutral roles and
under-investment in other forms of more partisan or advocacy-based
conflict intervention. 32 Whether or not one accepts Mayer's entire ar-
gument, the general observation is powerful, and disquieting.
C. Lessons About the Lawyer's Role
In addition to these lessons for students of negotiation, the Mas-
terCard experience illustrates a key insight of modern practice: the
lawyer's role is difficult to pigeon hole.
Drawing neat distinctions between litigators and transactional
attorneys, for example, is neither accurate nor helpful. In some in-
stances, such as the MasterCard IPO, creative lawyers blur these
lines - finding transactional solutions to litigation problems, or (obvi-
ously) bringing litigation to solve transactional concerns. Lawyers
can lead in corporate life, rather than simply respond - they can initi-
ate major corporate initiatives rather than merely serve as scriveners
or even transaction cost engineers. More and more, the role of promi-
nent in house counsel is recognized as a central part of corporate
leadership, and legal moves as a central part of corporate strategy.
Fleischer's analysis of the "branding" aspects of the IPO con-
cludes with encouraging words for attorneys - such creative lawyer-
ing opens up new possibilities for the legal profession as branding
agents rather than mere scribes. I am not entirely convinced that
lawyers will take on public relations and marketing concerns as pri-
mary objectives, although I agree with the general notion that these
deals do have branding implications. I am certain, however, that
lawyers were deeply involved in coming up with the MasterCard IPO
structure as a creative means of reducing antitrust exposure, and
that is enough for me. It shows that litigation lawyers can consider
and use transactional lawyering to their advantage, and that they
can think beyond the next motion or discovery request. Moreover, it
shows that some attorneys - particularly general counsel - remain
sufficiently "generalist" in orientation and training that they can
switch easily from one legal modality to another.
31. BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN CON-
FLICT RESOLUTION 4 (2004).
32. Id. at 17.
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III. CONCLUSION
This Commentary has argued that the MasterCard IPO served to
partially free MasterCard of its historical affiliation with Visa, and
that this will increase its bargaining power in various ongoing legal
battles going forward. In addition, I have drawn negotiation lessons
from the IPO and from MasterCard's antitrust litigation generally, to
illustrate that good lawyering can sometimes make a real difference
in the course of complex modem litigation. The MasterCard IPO is a
useful case study, not only of the intricacies of antitrust liability in
the charge card industry but also of the creative potential of the law-
yer's role.
